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The Effect of Bargaining Structure 
on Negotiated Wage Settlements 
Robert Swidinski 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect ofthe struc-
ture of collective bargaining on union bargaining power. More 
specifically, its objective is to détermine whether bargaining 
through employer's association, multi-employer, single (multi-
plant) employer or single-plant negotiation units has had an effect 
on negotiated wage settlements (union wage changes) in the pri-
vate sector in Canada. 
There is wide-spread récognition that the structure of collective bar-
gaining (identified by type of negotiation unit) plays a vital rôle in an indus-
trial relations system. It can hâve important implications for the aims, ob-
jectives and stratégies of the unions; it can affect industrial peace, wage 
structures, uniformity in working conditions and intra-firm labour rela-
tions; and it can alter relative bargaining power between union and manage-
ment. In gênerai, the bargaining processes and the bargaining outcomes are 
likely to be significantly différent under alternative bargaining structures. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of the structure of collec-
tive bargaining on union bargaining power. More specifically, its objective 
is to détermine whether bargaining through employers' association, multi-
employer, single (multi-plant) employer or single-plant negotiation units 
has had an effect on negotiated wage settlements (union wage changes) in 
the private sector in Canada. 
Although there is no universally accepted theory linking bargaining 
power with différent types of bargaining structures1, many industrial rela-
tions analysts hâve subscribed to the view that wider (or more centralized 
• SWIDINSKY, Robert, Professor, Department of Economies, University of Guelph. 
•• This study was conducted while the author was visiting the Industrial Relations 
Research Unit at the University of Warwick. Financial Assistance was provided by the Centre 
for the Study of Inflation and Productivity. A more detailed version of this study is available in 
the Economie Council of Canada Discussion Paper No. 139. 
1 Livernash (1963) and Weber (1967) hâve conducted perhaps the most exhaustive 
analysis of the effects that spécifie bargaining structures are likely to exert on relative bar-
gaining power under différent labour and product market conditions and corporation and 
union structures. Their analyses suggest that generalizations are not possible. The effects dé-
pend on the spécifie nature of the product and labour markets and the corporate and union 
structures. 
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negotiation units) may confer a power advantage to organized labour. For 
example, Lewis (1951) argued that union monopoly power could be curbed 
by limiting the size of collective bargaining units and making collusion 
among them unlawful. Weber (1963) noted that, whereas it was unclear how 
centralized bargaining affected relative bargaining power in European 
countries, extrême decentralization of collective bargaining in Japan ap-
peared to restrain union power. More recently, Hildebrand (1972) and 
Northrup (1973) hâve argued that, in the long run, centralized negotiation 
units may enhance already inflated union power. Ulman (1974) has similar-
ly argued that centralized bargaining may be more inflation-prone, but he 
also noted that a centralized System may be more amenable to officiai wage 
restraint policy than a decentralized system. 
However, thèse views are not generally supported by the empirical 
analysis conducted by Hendricks (1975) for the United States and by 
Thompson, Mulvey and Farbman (1977) for Great Britain. Both studies 
concentrate on the wage level rather than its rate of change. The British 
analysis is based on wage differential between samples of employées in simi-
lar industries and occupations but differentiated by type of bargaining 
structure, whereas the U.S. study is based on an estimated wage level rela-
tionship. Although the methodology and the types of bargaining structures 
analyzed are différent, both studies conclude that the monopoly power of 
unions is not increased by highly centralized bargaining. However, the fin-
dings reported by Hendricks are considerably more complex. In comparison 
with employer-wide negotiation units, plant-level and industry-wide units 
pay lower wages (with the latter negotiation units paying the lowest wages), 
whereas local multi-employer negotiation units pay higher wage levels than 
ail other types of negotiation units. Given the apparent conflict between a 
priori expectations and the empirical évidence, it seems appropriate to sub-
ject the hypothesis that centralized bargaining enhances union bargaining 
power to an additional empirical test using wage change analysis. 
One of the main features in this study is the use of micro data for in-
dividual Canadian wage contracts. The basic wage change findings reported 
in this study are based on 2,338 wage agreements containing 200 or more 
employées and signed during the 1966-75 time period2. In this sample of 
2 The data base is an unpublished source made available by Mr. Dan Rosenbloom, 
Chief Collective Bargaining Division, Canada Department of Labour, Ottawa. This data base 
includes the settlements for bargaining groups containing 200 or more employées. Wage con-
tracts which were excluded from the study consist of construction sector settlements, which 
were not part of the sample until recently, and contracts with cost-of-living clauses. This latter 
group of 574 contracts were excluded because of the diversity of the COLA clauses (e.g. dif-
férent formulas, caps, triggers, etc.). While it is conceivable that the exclusion of COLA con-
tracts may affect the results, the problem of translating the COLA clauses imo base rate 
changes are too severe to be handled in this paper. The termination date of our sample coin-
cides with the introduction of wage and price controls (Anti-Inflation Board) in Canada. 
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wage agreements, 1,217 agreements (52.1 percent) were negotiated by 
single-plant negotiation units, 811 (34.7 percent) by single (multi-plant) em-
ployer units, 110 (4.7 percent) by multi-employer units and 200 (8.5 percent) 
by employers' associations3. The vast majority of the employer's associa-
tions in our sample operated in local product markets. 
In the first section we specify the wage model which is used throughout 
this analysis. Our model départs from the conventional price expectations 
— Phillips curve model in that it includes price catch-up, wage spillovers 
and several institutional forces as additional explanatory variables4. Section 
II contains estimâtes of our wage change équations for the private sector 
and the final section summarizes our findings. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Wage settlements negotiated in the private sector are assumed to be 
determined bythe foliowing factors: excess labour demand (VRHW), price 
expectations (Pe), price catch-up (P c u) , wage spillovers (S), union density 
(UD), a set of industry-specific dummy variables (ISj) and a set of intercept-
shift dummy variables representing the types of negotiation units (NUj). 
(1) W = C + yVRHW + aPe + 3PCU + ÔS 
o 
n k 
+ 0UD + £ À. IS. + £ p.NU. 
1=1 x 1
 i = l J J 
3 The criterion used to distinguish between the four types of negotiation units (single-
plant, single-employer, multi-employer and employers' association) are as follows. Settlements 
negotiated at a single location by a single firm (either single-plant or multi-plant) were clas-
sified into singje-plant negotiation units. Settlements negotiated at several locations by a single, 
multi-plant firm were classified into single-employer negotiation units. Settlements were 
assumed to be negotiated by mujti^employer units if they were listed under several firms, or if 
they belonged to the same spécifie SIC group and had the same seulement and expiry dates. 
Employers' associations were explicitly identified in the description of the employers in the 
contract settlement. Technically, multi-employer and employers' association units belong to 
the same type of bargaining structure. The main distinction is that the former is comprised of 
two or three firms in the industry whereas the latter generally encompasses ail employers in a 
given local product or labour market. While our method of classification may hâve its limita-
tions, the distribution of major collective agreements by type of negotiation units it yielded for 
1973 is not dissimilar from the 1965 distribution reported by Waisglass and Craig (1968), Table 
1, despite the fact that the sample of collective agreements and the criteria for assigning nego-
tiation units were not identical in the two years. Had COLA agreements been included in our 
sample, the distribution would hâve remained basically unchanged. 
4 While there should probably be other (firm-specific) variables in a micro-wage équa-
tion, expérimentation with profits, productivity and concentration produced insignificant or 
perverse results. Other variables that might be used in a micro-wage change équation were not 
available at this time. 
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The dépendent variable is the total percentage change in base wage rates 
over the life of the contract expressed at an annual compound rate. The first 
four explanatory variables in our model (VRHW, P e , P c u , S) hâve received 
considérable attention elsewhere5, but it may be helpful to summarize the 
arguments briefly. 
While the usual proxy for excess labour demand is the aggregate unem-
ployment rate, it is our contention that this proxy is no longer a consistent 
measure of relevant labour market conditions. A number of structural and 
démographie changes within the Canadian labour market, such as the age-
sex-family status characteristics of the unemployed, the composition of the 
labour force and revisions in the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Act, 
may account for the démise of the unemployment rate variable as a proxy 
for excess labour demand in wage détermination studies. In any case, the 
aggregate unemployment rate generally displays a perverse relationship in 
Canadian wage équations estimated for récent years6. 
In terms of the unemployment-vacancy relationship, the declining per-
formance of the unemployment rate in wage change équations may mean 
that the shift in the U-V curve, which appears to hâve started in the early 
1970's, originated on the unemployment rather than the vacancy side7. 
Since the vacancy rate has been found to be a more consistent proxy for ex-
cess labour demand, we employ the Department of Finance regionalized 
help-wanted index normalized by the size of the régional labour force 
(VRHW) as an indicator of labour market conditions8. Thus, our vacancy 
rate variable captures the labour market conditions within the spécifie géo-
graphie région in which the individual micro wage seulement was nego-
tiated. However, the national help-wanted index is utilized for inter-
régional contracts. Finally, the help-wanted vacancy rate variable is spe-
cified for the quarter of the year which précèdes the wage contract seule-
ment date. 
Our proxy for price expectations is based on a weak form of the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis. We assume that the actual price inflation (as 
measured by the quarterly change in the consumer price index) at time t can 
be described by a distributed lag of past values of inflation and an error 
term. Using this auto-regressive équation, we can generate values of future 
price expectations for contracts of any given duration8a. 
5 See, for example, Christofides, Swidinsky and Wilton (1980a, 1980b). 
6 The évidence is presented in Christofides, Swidinsky and Wilton (1980a). 
7 See Green and Cousineau (1976). 
8 Five broad économie régions were used: Atlantic, Québec, Ontario, Prairies and B.C. 
8a A technical démonstration of this point is available from the author upon request. 
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Price catch-up, while not as common as the first two factors, has been 
proposed by a number of authors, including Turnovsky (1972), Turnovsky 
and Wachter (1972), Johnston and Timbrell (1973) and de Menil and Bhalla 
(1975). A price catch-up variable can be rationalized as a measure of firm 
spécifie excess demand for labour, but the typical explanation has been that 
of a bargaining demand. To illustrate the potential rôle of a price catch-up 
variable, consider a three-year Canadian wage contract signed in 1972. Bas-
ed on a reasonable estimate of annual price expectations of 5 percent, 
labour would hâve suffered an unexpected 15 percent loss in real wages 
during this three-year period of unanticipated inflation. It would be naive to 
assume that, during the 1975 contract negotiation, labour would bargain as 
if this loss did not occur (i.e. accept the loss in perpetuity) and make wage 
demands only in terms of expected inflation during the next contract 
period. At the negotiation table, bygones are clearly not bygones but impor-
tant issues at the next contract negotiation. 
Given our micro data base, our spécification of price catch-up can be 
much more précise than those spécifications that use aggregate, time séries 
data. As defined in Equation (2) below, our proxy for price catch-up allows 
for both (i) unexpected inflation, and (ii) the possibility that ail of expected 
inflation is not incorporated into wages ex ante (i.e. a < 1.0). Turnovski 
(1972) and de Menil and Bhalla (1975) hâve constrained the " a " in their 
price catch-up term to be unity, but hâve estimated the coefficient on cur-
rent price expectations freely. While their spécification does capture "unex-
pected" inflation, our proxy provides a measure of "uncompensated" past 
inflation. Ail of our models in the next section are estimated non-linearly in 
order to provide an identical estimate of " a " for both of its appearances 
within the wage change équation. 
Finally, the values of successive contract lengths (the£'s) are crucial in 
determining the magnitude of uncompensated inflation and the period of 
time for which this shortfall can be apportioned. In our sample, contract 
length varies considerably both across micro units and over time (for the 
same micro unit). The above-mentioned studies which include price catch-
up in their wage change model hâve, of necessity, assumed constant con-
tract length in an aggregative framework. Thus, our catch-up results based 
on micro data where we hâve précise information on successive individual 
contracts provide a much sharper statistical test for the relative merits of the 
price catch-up déterminant of wages. 
(2) P c u = ( P * ^ - 0 P « _ 1 ) * a t _ l M t 
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where Pat_i : actual percentage change in the C.P.I. over the previous con-
tract (at an annual rate) 
Pet_l : expected change in priées at the signing date of previous con-
tract (at annual rate) 
a
 : coefficient for price expectations 
£ t : length of current contract 
£t_l : length of previous contract 
It is our contention that labour will bargain just as vigorously for "un-
compensated" past inflation as it does for anticipated future inflation. The 
fact that inflation is unexpected is no reason to dismiss it from the bargain-
ing process. Furthermore, if it is well understood by both sides of a wage 
contract that "uncompensated" past inflation will be included as a bargain-
ing issue in the next wage negotiation, then 100 percent of future expected 
inflation may not be included in wages ex ante. Given the uncertainty of 
future price expectations over a two to three year horizon (the usual con-
tract length) and the opportunity to correct past expectational errors ex 
post, the wage détermination process may assign a relatively lower weight to 
uncertain expectations of future inflation. 
The rôle of wage spillovers in the wage change model has been explored 
in several studies, but most notably in Eckstein and Wilson (1962), McGuire 
and Rapping (1968) and Mehra (1976). While thèse studies hâve not resolv-
ed the problem of distinguishing between neo-classical labour supply forces 
and institutional spillover effects, they nonetheless suggest that wage spill-
overs are relevant in the wage détermination process in at least sorne indus-
tries. However, since the use of quarterly or annual data discards valuable 
information pertaining to the exact timing of wage settlements (a key factor 
in establishing wage spillover patterns), the existence of wage spillovers (in-
terdependencies) can best be detected by the direct analysis of micro wage 
date prior to aggregation. Not only does one avoid institutional economet-
ric problems, but there are clear gains in the précision of the estimâtes deriv-
ed from micro data prior to aggregation. 
In our wage change model, spillover effects are captured by a variable 
constructed from preceding wage settlements within a référence group of 
wage settlements identified by spécifie industry and régional characteristics. 
Thus, wage spillovers into the i t n wage settlement can originate only from 
preceding settlements in the spécifie industry and région to which the i t n 
bargaining unit belongs9. Ail past settlements are constrained to carry equal 
9 There are many other référence groups one can employ, such as broad industry (any 
région), région (any industry), key group, public sector, etc. Of the many référence groups 
tried, the spécifie industry-region group gave best results. The allocation of wage settlement in-
to spécifie industry and région was, of necessity, rather arbitrary. A detailed description of the 
spécifie industry-regional référence groups will be supplied by the author upon request. 
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weight, and thus the spillover variable is the simple average of preceding 
wage settlements in the spécifie industry-region référence group10. In esti-
mating our wage équations, successive past settlements (in reverse chrono-
logical order) were added to the spill-over variable until the standard error 
of estimate for the régression commenced to increase. 
The remaining explanatory variables (UD, ISj, NU;) give our model its 
"institutional" dimensions. Union density (UD) is specified as the propor-
tion of the labour force in the industry containing the spécifie wage seule-
ment that is unionized11. Several studies, but particularly those by Ross and 
Goldner (1950) and Segal (1961), hâve indicated a strong positive relation-
ship between interindustry rates of increase in wages and the extent of union 
strength (measured by the proportion of production workers covered by 
collective agreements). While there is no a priori reason for disputing thèse 
findings, it would be interesting to détermine whether they can be confirm-
ed using an alternative methodological approach12. 
The industry dummy variables (ISj) are designed to capture industry-
specific influences that would not otherwise hâve been captured in the 
model13. ISj takes on a value of unity if the wage settlement is negotiated in 
io We also experimented with an unconstrained weight model (the weights attached to 
past settlements being freely estimated) and a time decay polynomial model (the weights of past 
settlements being assumed to lie on a quadratic time polynomial). See Christofides, Swidinsky 
and Wilton (1980b) for a more thorough discussion. 
n The industrial classification was at the two-digit S.I.C. level. The union density data 
pertains to 1971 since this is the only year for which detailed industrial labour force data are 
available. However, interindustry union density is unlikely to hâve varied much over the 
1966-75 period. 
12 While Rees (1961), Lewis (1963) and Levinson (1967) critieize the Ross and Goldner 
and Segal studies, their criticism is directed primarily against the finding that the ability of a 
union to achieve wage increases is enhanced by monopolistic product markets. On the other 
hand, Reuber (1970) was unable to detect a significant relationship between the degree of 
unionization across industries and the rate of change in wages across industries in Canada from 
1961 to 1966. 
13 It is recognized that such industry-specific dummy variables in a wage change équa-
tion hâve their limitations. For example, they are not very informative in that they do not pin-
point the industry-specific influences. However, attempts to include such firm and industry-
specific variables as profits, productivity, concentration and size of the negotiation unit pro-
vided insignificant or perverse results. 
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the i t n industry (otherwise zéro)14. Finally, NUj defines a set of bargaining 
structure intercept-shift dummy variables. NUj assumes a value of unity if 
the wage settlement was negotiated through an employer's association 
(otherwise zéro); NU2 assumes a value of unity if the wage settlement was 
negotiated by a multi-employer negotiation unit (otherwise zéro); and NU3 
assumes a value of unity if the wage settlement was negotiated by a single 
(multi-plant) employer negotiation unit (otherwise zéro). The omitted bar-
gaining structure is the single-plant negotiation unit. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 présents the estimated wage change équations for 2,338 private 
sector negotiated wage settlements for the period 1966-75. The équations 
are presented in a step-wise manner in order to highlight any interactions 
that may exist between the union density, industry structure and negotiation 
unit variables and the more traditional déterminants of wage change. Equa-
tion 1, containing only the price, labour market and spillover variables, 
gives strong statistical support for our price expectations-price catch-up 
wage change model. Both estimated price coefficients are highly significant 
and indicate that ex post compensation for past price inflation is more im-
portant in the wage détermination process than ex ante compensation for 
future price expectations (i.e. a coefficient of .697 versus .259). Under a 
constant fully anticipated inflation rate, the combined ex ante et ex post 
compensation for inflation (the sum of the two price coefficients minus 
their cross-product i.e. a + B -aB) is 78 percent. That is, slightly more than 
three-quarters of constant fully anticipated price increases are built into 
wage settlements. The labour market coefficient is correctly signed and sig-
nificantly différent from zéro, but its value indicates that the implicit 
Phillips curve has a relatively gentle slope15. Finally, the estimated spillover 
coefficient is highly significant and implies that in excess of 40 percent of 
the average increase in past wage settlements spills over into current wage 
negotiations16. 
14 The industry classifications are forestry and fishing (ISj), mining (IS2), non-durable 
manufacturing (IS3), durable manufacturing (IS4), transportation, communications and other 
utilities (IS5), trade (IS6) and finance (IS7). The omitted industry is services. 
15 In the 1966-75 period VRHW had a range of 2.14 and a mean of 1.36. 
16 The introduction of the wage spillover variable into the basic wage change équation 
containing prices and labour market conditions produces a substantial improvement in the 
goodness-of-fit. See Christofides, Swidinsky and Wilton (1980b). Although the price coeffi-
cients are affected by the addition of the wage spillover variable, the order of compensation re-
mains unchanged. Somewhat surprisingly, the labour market effect on price changes is 
strengthened by the introduction of wage relativities. 
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TABLE 1 
Wage Change Régressions for Negotiated Wage Settlements 
in the Private Sector, Canada 1966-75 





Constant 1.815 ( 2.38) 1.797 ( 2.73) 2.663 ( 3.03) 
P e .259 ( 3.23) .213 ( 2.55) .223 ( 2.87) 
pCU 
.697 (14.34) .692 (13.99) .670 (14.73) 
VRHW 3.276 ( 5.13) 3.679 ( 5.51) 3.489 ( 5.65) 
S .412 (15.05) .420 (14.62) .372 (12.53) 
UD - .028 ( 2.65) 
«h 3.006 ( 3.06) 
is2 2.026 ( 1.86) 
is3 .984 ( 1.28) 
is4 .028 ( .04) 
is5 .672 ( .76) 
K*6 1.986 ( 2.49) 
IS7 - .808 ( .27) 
NUj .608 ( 1.13) .004 ( .01) 
NU2 - .630 ( .90) -1.335 ( 2.01) 
NU3 -1.101 ( 3.35) -1.085 ( 2.87) 
S.E.E. 4.078 4.067 4.032 
R2 .475 .478 .488 
The addition of the set of bargaining structure dummy variables to the 
wage change équation shows that some types of negotiation units may exert 
a significant effect on negotiated wage settlements. While the estimated em-
ployer s' association (NUj) and multi-employer (NU2) coefficients in équa-
tion 2 are not significantly différent from zéro, the single-employer (NU3) 
coefficient is négative and significant. The remaining price, labour market 
and spillover coefficients are basically unaffected by the introduction of the 
bargaining structure dummy variables. 
When the union density and industry structure variables are added in 
équation 3, the size and significance of the estimated NU3 (single-employer) 
coefficient remains basically unaffected. On the other hand, the négative 
NU2 (multi-employer) coefficient more than doubles in absolute size and 
becomes significant whereas the NUj (employers' association) coefficient 
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becomes very small and highly insignificant. This suggests a relatively 
strong interaction between some bargaining structures and other (unspeci-
fied) structural characteristics of the industries. 
The results in équation 3 imply that certain types of negotiation units 
tend to restrain negotiated wage settlements. In comparison with single-
plant negotiation units, employers' association units tend to negotiate com-
parable wage increases whereas single-employer and multi-employer units 
tend to negotiate significantly lower wage increases. In effect, settlements 
negotiated through single-employer and multi-employer negotiation units 
are 1.08 and 1.33 percent lower, respectively, than settlements negotiated 
through alternative (single-plant and employers' association) negotiation 
units17. 
Turning to the other "institutional" variables in équation 3, union 
density and industry structure hâve only a marginal effect on the estimated 
price, labour market and spillover coefficients. The union density coeffi-
cient is négative and significant, suggesting that unions in weakly organized 
industries hâve been able to negotiate higher wage settlements18. This resuit 
contradicts previous studies, based on interindustry data, which suggest 
that unions in strongly organized industries are able to negotiate higher 
wage increases. Although the estimated union density coefficient is relative-
ly small, it nonetheless implies that a 20 percent increase in an industry's 
union density (the mean for ail industries in 1971 was 26.8 percent) would 
resuit in a 0.6 percent réduction in negotiated wage settlements. 
Only three of the seven industry-specific coefficients are significantly 
différent from zéro. Settlements in forestry, fishing and trade appear to be 
higher by 2.0 to 3.0 percent than in other industries. While the finding that 
unions in resource industries hâve been able to negotiate higher wage in-
creases than unions in other industries is not surprising, it is surprising that 
unions in the trade sector would hâve such exhorbitant bargaining power. 
In gênerai, however, the institutional variables contribute very little to 
the overall explanatory powers of the estimating équation, even though 5 of 
the 11 estimated institutional coefficients are significantly différent from 
n However, a standard F-test shows that the single-employer and muki-employer 
estimated coefficients are not significantly différent. The calculated and critical F-values are 
.135 and 1.64, respectively. 
18 One may speculate that this resuit is due to some interaction between product market 
concentration and union density in the industry. However, a wage change model containing 
P e , P c u , VRHW, S, UD and a concentration variable tested for 1,482 wage settlements in 
manufacturing shows that this is not the case. The coefficient on the concentration variable is 
positive but insignificant whereas the union density coefficient is négative and generally signifi-
cant. 
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zéro. The adjusted increases only marginally from .475 in équation 1 to 
.488 in équation 3 when the full set of institutional variables is included. In-
dividual institutional variables, nonetheless, play a significant rôle in deter-
mining the outcome of wage bargains. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Using base rate data in the private sector, the results of our wage 
change model show that the structure of collective bargaining has had a sig-
nificant effect on negotiated wage settlements. When other factors, such as 
price changes, labour market conditions, spillover effects, union density 
and industry structure are taken into account, the type of negotiation unit 
engaged in the bargaining process still plays an effective rôle in determining 
the size of wage settlements. Specifically, settlements negotiated through 
single (multi-plant) employer and multi-employer negotiation units are ap-
proximately one percent lower than settlements negotiated through single-
plant and employers' association negotiation units. With the exception of 
plant-level units, thèse results are basically consistent with those reported by 
Hendricks (1975). 
Our results imply that large, multi-plant firms bargaining as company-
wide units hâve considérable bargaining power. In highly concentrated in-
dustries the dominant firms are relatively immune from whipsawing by the 
unions. Moreover, if the firms are multi-national they can use their interna-
tional opérations to whipsaw the unions. In multi-employer negotiation 
units the unions are in an even weaker bargaining position since their ability 
to employ whipsawing tactics are fairly limited. Also, the firms organized 
into multi-employer units are likely to be relatively homogenous, unlike the 
unions who must contend with régional and local interests. 
On the other hand, plant-level bargaining appears to provide a large, 
national union with considérable bargaining power. If the plants belong to 
single-plant firms or to vertically integrated firms the union can exert con-
sidérable pressure by using whipsawing tactics. Similarly association bar-
gaining in local product markets that are completely unionized provides the 
union with a significant power advantage. Since the employers hâve dif-
férent cost structures, and thus divergent interests, it is highly likely that 
some of the employers in an employers' association may break ranks under 
the pressure of a strike. Thus, although employers' associations are basical-
ly défensive mechanisms, there is little évidence to suggest that they hâve 
performed very effectively19. 
19 Obviously, there are many différent ways to interpret our results. It is fairly clear, 
however, that the effects of bargaining structure on relative bargaining power are complex and 
not easily generalized. For some additional arguments that can be used to explain our results 
see Livernash (1963), Weber (1967) and Ulman (1974). 
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While our results show that the consolidation of bargaining units at the 
single-employer or multi-employer level may provide significant gains in 
employer bargaining power, they do not imply that wider negotiation units 
will in gênerai produce wage restraint. In particular, a shift to empioyers' 
association bargaining in local product markets will not necessarily enhance 
employer bargaining power above what it would hâve been under plant-
level bargaining. Thus, while local empioyers' associations may confer ad-
vantages in some areas of industrial relations (i.e. reduced industrial con-
flict, reduced compétition among empioyers, convenience in bargaining, 
etc.), they appear to be weak bargaining institutions in terms of wage re-
straint. That is, limiting a union's ability to implement whipsawing tech-
niques by forming an empioyers' association does not appear to hâve 
enhanced employer bargaining power. 
Finally, among our more interesting findings is the suggestion that 
unions in weakly organized industries hâve been able to negotiate higher 
wage settlements than unions in strongly organized industries20. This fin-
ding is in direct contradiction to earlier findings based on interindustry 
data. However, the interindustry results may hâve reflected differential 
wage changes for union and non-union workers. Thus, if union workers 
receive higher wage increases than non-union workers, it foliows that 
strongly organized industries will display higher wage increases as well. Our 
resuit, since it is based on micro wage settlement data, avoids such compli-
cations and is thus likely to be more accurate. 
Admittedly, however, it is difficult to find theoretical arguments that 
would support this empirical resuit. One interprétation may be that it 
reflects différences among firms that are organized. In weakly organized in-
dustries only the most successful firms may be unionized. Thèse firms may 
employ a superior work force and possess the greatest ability to pay. More-
over, unions in weakly organized industries may find it necessary to nego-
tiate higher contracts in order to justify their existence. In more densely 
organized industries wage settlements may be reduced because of the 
présence of many unionized marginal firms. Nonetheless, since this finding 
contradicts a widely-held position (backed by some supporting empirical 
évidence), it should be regarded with a certain degree of skepticism unless 
confirmed by additional research. 
20 Our resuit is not reversée! even when an industry concentration variable is included in 
the équation. 
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L'effet des structures de négociation sur le règlement 
des conditions salariales 
Bien qu'il n'y ait pas de lien théorique universellement acceptable entre la struc-
ture de négociation collective et le règlement des questions salariales par négociation, 
les analystes des relations professionnelles ont depuis longtemps reconnu que le type 
d'unités de négociation retenu dans la négociation collective peut avoir un effet sur le 
processus de détermination des salaires. D'une façon générale, on estime que des 
unités de négociation plus vastes ou plus centralisées mettent en valeur le pouvoir de 
négociation du syndicat, bien que la preuve empirique dont on dispose permette de 
penser que le pouvoir monopoleur des syndicats ne soit pas accentué par une négo-
ciation fortement centralisée. 
L'article vérifie l'hypothèse selon laquelle le type d'unités de négociation (unité 
de négociation par établissement, unité de négociation par compagnie, unité de 
négociation multipartite ou association d'employeurs) retenu dans la négociation 
collective a un effet sur les ententes salariales négociées dans le secteur privé au 
Canada. L'analyse se fonde sur le modèle de la courbe de Phillips où la variable 
dépendante consiste dans le pourcentage du changement dans les taux de salaire de 
base pendant la durée de la convention collective. Entrent aussi en ligne de compte 
plusieurs variables indépendantes, y compris l'une qui représente les différents types 
d'unités de négociation. 
Les résultats se fondent sur l'étude de 2,338 conventions collectives régissant 
200 salariés ou davantage qui ont été conclues entre 1966 et 1975. Dans cet échantil-
lon, on compte 1,217 conventions collectives négociées dans des unités de négocia-
tion par établissement; 811, dans des unités de négociation par compagnie; 110, dans 
des unités de négociation multipartites et, enfin, 200, qui ont été négociées avec des 
associations d'employeurs. 
Les résultats obtenus démontrent que la structure de négociation collective a un 
effet significatif sur les règlements des questions salariales. Les accords négociés dans 
les conventions collectives où les unités de négociation sont accordées par compagnie 
ou sont multipartites sont en moyenne d'un pour cent inférieurs à ceux qu'on ob-
serve dans des conventions collectives négociées dans des unités de négociation par 
établissement ou avec des associations d'employeurs. 
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Il en découle que les entreprises possédant plusieurs vastes établissements ont un 
pouvoir de négociation fort. Dans des industries fortement concentrées, les entre-
prises dominantes sont en quelque sorte immunisées contre la surenchère des syndi-
cats. De plus, si ces entreprises sont des multinationales, elles peuvent utiliser leurs 
opérations internationales pour faire de la surenchère de leur côté. Dans les négocia-
tions où l'unité de négociation est multipartite, les syndicats se trouvent dans une 
position plus faible, puisque les tactiques de surenchère sont limitées à cause du 
caractère relativement homogène des entreprises. 
D'un autre côté, la négociation au niveau de l'établissement permet à un syndi-
cat puissant d'avoir un pouvoir de négociation considérable. S'il s'agit d'entreprises 
possédant un seul établissement ou de firmes intégrées verticalement, le syndicat peut 
exercer une forte pression en recourant à des tactiques de surenchère. 
De même, lorsqu'une association d'employeurs négocie dans un marché de pro-
duits ou de services locaux où le taux de syndicalisation est élevé, le syndicat possède 
un avantage marqué. Étant donné que les employeurs ont des structures de prix 
différentes, donc des intérêts divergents, il est très vraisemblable que quelques-uns 
d'entre eux puissent rompre les rangs sous la menace d'une grève. 
Alors que les résultats montrent que la consolidation des unités de négociation 
au niveau de l'unité par compagnie ou de l'unité multipartite peut signifier des gains 
significatifs dans le pouvoir de négociation de l'employeur, cela n'implique pas que 
des unités de négociation plus vastes puissent donner lieu à des contraintes en matière 
de taux de salaire. Notamment, une orientation vers la négociation par une associa-
tion d'employeurs ne serait pas de nature à valoriser le pouvoir de négociation de ces 
derniers, même si ces groupements locaux peuvent avoir des avantages sur certains 
points. En fait, la formation d'associations d'employeurs ne limite pas la possibilité 
pour le syndicat d'utiliser des tactiques de surenchère et ne semble pas non plus ac-
croître le pouvoir de marchandage des employeurs. 
Enfin, les constatations faites paraissent indiquer que les syndicats, dans les in-
dustries peu syndicalisées, ont été en mesure de négocier des règlements salariaux 
plus élevés que ceux des industries fortement syndicalisées. Ce dernier résultat con-
tredit les découvertes antérieures et il faut, en conséquence, le considérer avec 
réserve. 
